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Abstract—The concept of device-to-device (D2D) communica-
tions underlaying cellular networks opens up potential benefits
for improving system performance but also brings new challenges
such as interference management. In this paper, we propose
a pricing framework for interference management from the
D2D users to the cellular system, where the base station (BS)
protects itself (or its serving cellular users) by pricing the cross-
tier interference caused from the D2D users. A Stackelberg
game is formulated to model the interactions between the BS
and D2D users. Specifically, the BS sets prices to a maximize
its revenue (or any desired utility) subject to an interference
temperature constraint. For given prices, the D2D users com-
petitively adapt their power allocation strategies for individual
utility maximization. We first analyze the competition among
the D2D users by noncooperative game theory and an iterative
based distributed power allocation algorithm is proposed. Then,
depending on how much network information the BS knows, we
develop two optimal algorithms, one for uniform pricing with
limited network information and the other for differentiated
pricing with global network information. The uniform pricing
algorithm can be implemented by a fully distributed manner
and requires minimum information exchange between the BS
and D2D users, and the differentiated pricing algorithm is
partially distributed and requires no iteration between the BS
and D2D users. Then a suboptimal differentiated pricing scheme
is proposed to reduce complexity and it can be implemented in
a fully distributed fashion. Extensive simulations are conducted
to verify the proposed framework and algorithms.
Index Terms—Device-to-Device (D2D), interference manage-
ment, distributed power allocation, pricing, and game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Incorporating device-to-device (D2D) communications as
an underlay to cellular networks attracts considerable interests
due to its potential benefits, like spectral/energy efficiency
improvements, coverage extension, and traffic offloading. Such
a heterogenous network consisting of infrastructure-based and
ad hoc networks can achieve better performance than in a
pure cellular or ad hoc network [2]–[5]. Very recently, D2D
in cellular networks has been studied and standardized by
the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term
Evolution Advanced (LTE-A) [6], [7].
However, the D2D enabled cellular networks pose new
challenges which are quite different from those of either
cellular networks or ad hoc networks, and thus significantly
complicate the network design. One of the most crucial issues
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is interference management. With spectrum reuse, D2D com-
munication can improve spectral efficiency and thus enhance
system throughput. However, intracell interference could be
severe in addition to intercell interference, because D2D
communication also causes interference to the cellular network
users. Therefore, methods for efficient interference manage-
ment and coordination must be developed to both cellular
and D2D users for taking full advantage of D2D communi-
cations. On the other hand, it is important to guarantee that
D2D communications do not generate harmful interference to
cellular communications since cellular networks operate on
licensed bands. This is similar to cognitive radio systems,
and one of the major differences is that D2D communications
can be controlled by cellular base station (BS) [3]–[5], [8],
whereas secondary users are not controlled by primary users
in cognitive radio networks.
There are several works for interference management in
D2D communications [9]–[13]. For instance, authors in [9]
formulated the channel assignment problem as a mixed inte-
ger nonlinear programming and proposed a greedy heuristic
algorithm to maximize total throughput while maintaining
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirements of
all users. In [10], power allocation was studied for throughput
maximization with minimum and maximum SINR constraints.
Both [9] and [10] assumed that one channel can be occupied by
at most one D2D-cellular user pair. Interference management
schemes were presented in [11] based on a predefined interfer-
ence limited area. The authors in [12] adopted a combinatorial
auction approach to assign the cellular users’ channels to
the D2D users for total throughput maximization. Optimal
centralized and distributed mode selection between cellular
communication and D2D communication for each user were
investigated in [13]. Joint channel and power allocation using
in combinatorial auction was also studied in [14], [15] .
In a realistic spectrum-sharing network, the interests of
the D2D-tier and the cellular-tier may be inconsistent due
to the cross-tier (i.e., D2D-to-cellular and cellular-to-D2D)
interference. To this end, in this paper, we target at jointly
optimizing the possibly conflicting objectives of the two tiers,
which is essentially different from the above mentioned works
[9]–[12] which are system-wide optimization by resource
allocations.
Specifically, to ensure that the aggregate received interfer-
ence at the BS is kept below an acceptable level, we impose
an interference temperature constraint at the BS, and the BS
prices the received interference caused from the D2D users.
We note that interference temperature constraint has been com-
monly adopted at BS in heterogeneous networks (e.g., [16],
[17]) and primary user in cognitive radio networks (e.g., [18]–
[21]). Nevertheless, in the schemes [17]–[21], the incentives
of BS and primary user were not considered. In other words,
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interference temperature constraint but not to maximize the
utilities of themselves, i.e. the BS and primary user have no
utility. Though [16] considered the BS’s incentive, the authors
mainly focused on sparse-deployment users, i.e., the mutual
interferences among users can be neglected.
Unlike these previous works, in this paper, by imposing
the interference temperature constraint at the BS side, the
interference tolerance margin at the BS is treated as a divisible
resource to be sold among the D2D users. This is because
enabling D2D communications underlaying cellular networks
brings severe interference to the original cellular system due
to spectrum-sharing. Thus D2D users pay extra prices (costs)
for causing undesirable interferences to the cellular system.
This is the idea of interference pricing. Moreover, interference
pricing is used not only as a game-theoretic approach to
balance the objectives of the D2D-tier and cellular-tier, but
also as a mediator among the mutually interfered D2D users.
These aspects make our pricing framework distinctly differ
from the related works on interference temperature constraint
in heterogeneous networks and cognitive radio networks (e.g.,
[16]–[22]).
It is worth noting that it hardly solves the resource alloca-
tion problems in interference channel with globally optimal
solutions in general even in a centralized environment. On the
other hand, game theory offers a set of mathematical tools to
study complex interactions among rational players and adapt
their choices of strategies. Therefore, game theory is a suitable
tool to model and analyze the resource allocation problems for
D2D networks. In game theory, the fictitious prices are usually
used as interaction information to coordinate and control the
transmissions of network nodes. In other words, the prices
have the economic interpretations but are actually system
parameters designed in resource allocation schemes.
In this paper, we model the interactions between the cellular-
tier and D2D-tier as a Stackelberg game. In D2D networks,
the BS provides services and the D2D users are controlled by
the BS for interference management. Thus the relationship of
the BS and D2D users is a bit like the hierarchical structure
(i.e. leader and followers) of Stackelberg game. Moreover, the
nodes may be myopic and maximize their own profits through
competition. This is our motivation of using Stackelberg game.
As the leader, the BS sells interference to maximize its revenue
(or any desired utility) under a maximum interference toler-
ance margin. As the followers, the D2D users then purchase
interference from the BS to maximize their payoffs. More
specifically, the D2D users are modeled as selfish players and
form a noncooperative power control subgame, where each
D2D user optimally chooses its own transmit power based on
local channel state information (CSI) in response to the power
allocation strategies of the other D2D users. We propose an
iteratively distributed power allocation algorithm to achieve
the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) point. Such a user-level
subgame is a classical noncooperative Nash power game. The
merit is that, given any price, the power outputs converge to
a stable solution with a distributed fashion. This is important
in D2D networks because D2D users communicate with each
other by ad-hoc manner and they are usually self-organized.
We also note that NE often leads to network performance
degradation compared with a globally optimal solution. Using
the idea of pricing in Stackelberg game, we propose two
optimal algorithms for uniform and differentiated pricing. We
further propose a suboptimal differentiated pricing scheme
with closed-form to reduce complexity. We show that the
proposed uniform pricing algorithm can be implemented by
a fully distributed manner and requires minimum information
exchange between the BS and D2D users, the proposed
optimal differentiated pricing algorithm is partially distributed
and requires no iteration between the BS and D2D users, and
the proposed suboptimal differentiated pricing algorithm is
fully distributed and without iteration.
Note that the basic idea of pricing used in our paper is
common with [16], but the proposed optimal algorithms for
uniform and differentiated pricing are new, which is the main
contribution of our paper. Specifically, the work [16] mainly
focused on sparse deployment (i.e. without interference among
users) and solved the problem by using Lagrangian duality
method for both uniform and differentiated pricing. For dense
deployment (i.e. with interference among users), the authors
in [16] solved the problem by exhaustive search over all
feasible spaces for both uniform and differentiated pricing.
In our paper, we focus on dense deployment because it is
more general in practice. For the uniform pricing, we shrink
the search space of price into a specific range by analyzing
the properties of the problem, which significantly reduces
the complexity. We further reduce the search complexity by
exploring the structure of the power allocation. For the differ-
entiated pricing, we first express the revenue function of the
BS in terms of transmit powers at the Nash equilibrium point
of the user-level subgame. Then the revenue maximization
problem is transformed into a linear programming problem.
By solving the linear programming problem, we can get the
optimal prices and, in turn, enforce the users to transmit the
desired powers at the Nash equilibrium point of the user-level
subgame. We further propose a suboptimal algorithm with
closed-form for differentiated pricing to reduce complexity,
which can be implemented in a fully distributed manner.
Therefore, we conclude that the proposed three algorithms are
fundamentally different from the exhaustive search method in
[16].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model and game-theoretic problem
formulation. In Section III, a distributed power allocation
algorithm for the D2D users as well as pricing algorithms are
developed. Comprehensive simulations are provided in Section
IV. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider a single two-tier cellular network as shown
in Fig. 1, where total N D2D users share the same uplink
spectrum of the cellular system and are allowed to transmit
simultaneously, i.e. frequency reuse factor of 1. When a D2D
source transmits information to its dedicated destination, it
not only harms other D2D destinations (co-tier interference)
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Fig. 1. System model of D2D communication underlaying a cellular network,
where the solid and dotted lines denote desired and interference signals,
respectively.
but also interferes with the BS (cross-tier interference). This
paper focuses on controlling the cross-tier interference, i.e.,
the interference from D2D sources to the BS, since it needs
to protect the original cellular system if integrating D2D com-
munications. Denote the D2D users as a set N := {1, · · · , N}
and each D2D user refers to a source-destination pair. In
what follows, we use “user(s)” instead of “D2D user(s)” for
convenience.
We assume that the transmission is based on slot basis,
the fading remains unchanged during each transmission slot
but possibly varies from one slot to another. Each slot is
assumed to be divided into two phases: the signaling phase
and the transmission phase. The signaling phase is used for
information interaction (or iteration until convergence), and
the transmission phase is used for data transmission with
constant power strategies fixed in the signaling phase. Here
it is assumed that a slot can be designed long enough in
the system so that the overhead of the signaling phase is
negligible. As shown in Fig. 1, the channel gain from source
i to destination j is denoted by hi,j , and the source i between
the BS is denoted by gi. All channel gains are modeled as
large-scale path loss along with small-scale Rayleigh fading.
The additive noise at the destination of user i is assumed to be
independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and variance σ2. The transmit power
of user i is denoted by pi, and denote p := {p1, · · · , pN}.
B. Stackelberg Game Formulation
We consider the Stackelberg game between the BS and the
users as shown in Fig. 2. The BS is the Stackelberg leader,
it first measures the interference temperature and then sets
the interference prices in Stage I. The users are followers
and choose their actions of power allocation to maximize
their individual payoffs in Stage II, according to the prices
announced from the BS in Stage I. We assume that the selfish
players are myopic, which means that the players maximize
Stage I 
BS announces interference prices
Stage II 
Users form a noncooperative power subgame
Fig. 2. The proposed Stackelberg game.
their immediate expected payoffs and do not intentionally
affect the strategies of others.
There are a variety of pricing schemes for wireless resource
allocations. For instance, individual users are charged in pro-
portion to transmit power [23]–[26], spectrum trading/access
[27], [28], received SINR [29]–[31], and throughput [32]–
[34]. For the problem considered in this paper, the BS must
guarantee that the aggregate received interference from all
users should be below the predefined threshold. Hence, it is
reasonable that the BS charges each user i by a price πi
corresponding to its caused interference pigi to the BS.
Denote pi := {π1, · · · , πN}. Here we treat the BS as the
Stackelberg leader. The goal of the BS is to set the optimal
interference prices pi to maximize its revenue charged from
the users within its tolerable aggregate interference margin.
Mathematically, the optimization problem at the BS’s side can
be expressed as
P1 : max
pi0
uB(pi) =
N∑
i=1
pigiπi (1a)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
pigi ≤ Ith, (1b)
where Ith is the maximum interference that the BS can
tolerate, and (1b) is the interference power constraint or
interference temperature constraint, which means that the total
received power from D2D users at the BS should be below a
threshold.
At the users’ side, the received SINR of user i can be written
as
γi(pi, p−i) =
pihi,i∑
j 6=i pjhj,i + σ
2
, (2)
where p−i := {p1, · · · , pi−1, pi+1, · · · , pN} is the vector of
power allocation of all the users except for user i.
The achievable rate of user i is given by
Ri(γi(pi, p−i)) = log(1 + γi(pi, p−i)). (3)
We define the payoff of user i as
ui(pi, p−i, πi) = wiRi(γi(pi, p−i))− pigiπi, (4)
where wi is the weight of user i. The payoff function of
each user is the difference between its transmission rate
and the payment that it needs to make to the BS for the
4caused interference. Note that the proposed algorithms in this
paper are not affected if the transmission rates are replaced
by general utility functions that are differentiable, strictly
increasing, and concave. We consider the transmission rates
as the utility functions only for ease of exposition.
At the users’ side, each user i aims to maximize its own
payoff by power adaption for given price πi set by the BS,
this problem can be formulated as
P2 : max
pi
ui(pi, p−i, πi) (5a)
s.t. 0 ≤ pi ≤ pi. (5b)
Note that the BS’s prices and the users’ power allocation
strategies are coupled in a very sophisticated way. Specifically,
the BS’s pricing decisions influence the users’ power alloca-
tion strategies which, in turn, impact the BS’s revenue. In the
following, we propose a Stackelberg game approach to study
their interactions.
III. USER AND BASE STATION OPTIMIZATION
The Stackelberg game falls into the class of dynamic game
and the objective of the game is to find the Stackelberg
Equilibrium (SE) point(s) which can be obtained by finding its
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (NE). The typical solution
for determining SE is backward induction [35]. Therefore,
we will start the Stackelberg game by analyzing the users’
behaviors in Stage II given the BS’s pricing decisions. Then
we will investigate the BS’s pricing strategies considering the
interference temperature constraint in Stage I. In this stage,
we propose two optimal pricing schemes, i.e., uniform pricing
and differentiated pricing. Notice that the backward induction
captures the sequential dependence of the decisions in the
two stages. Then a suboptimal differentiated pricing algorithm
is further proposed to reduce complexity. At the end of this
section, we simply discuss the complexity of the proposed
algorithms.
A. Distributed Power Allocation
Noncooperative game-theoretic approaches are effective to
characterize the selfish behaviors of self-interested players.
Knowing the prices set by the BS, the competition among the
users can be mathematically formulated as a noncooperative
power control subgame
G := {N , {Pi}, {ui}}, (6)
where N is the set of players (or users), Pi is the strategy
space of each user i ∈ N and defined as the interval Pi :=
{pi, 0 ≤ pi ≤ pi} that contains the power allocation choices,
and ui is the payoff of each user i ∈ N defined in (4).
The common concept for solving the noncooperative game
problems is the NE at which no user can increase its payoff by
unilaterally changing its own transmit power. Mathematically,
the power profile p∗ = {p∗1, p∗2, · · · , p∗N} is the NE point for
the user-level subgame G if, for every user, ui(p∗i , p∗−i, πi) ≥
ui(pi, p
∗
−i, πi), ∀pi ∈ Pi, ∀i ∈ N .
Another common concept in game theory is the best re-
sponse function Bi(p−i) for each player. Formally, define
Algorithm 1 Iterative Distributed Power Allocation
1: Given price vector pi  0.
2: Set t = 0 and initialize p(0) as any feasible vector.
3: repeat
4: t← t+ 1;
5: p(t+1) ← B
(
p
(t)
)
.
6: until p converges.
P−i :=
∏
j 6=i Pj as the set-valued function that assigns the
best powers to each interference power vector p−i ∈ P−i, then
Bi(p−i) := {pi ∈ Pi|ui(pi, p−i, πi) ≥ ui(p′i, p−i, πi), ∀p
′
i ∈
Pi}. The best response function Bi(p−i) reflects the best
power user i should transmit in response to the other users’
power strategies for the given price set by the BS.
It is easy to verify that the objective function of P2 in (5) is
concave in pi, and the constraint is affine. Thus P2 is a convex
problem and its optimal solution must satisfy the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [36]. By taking the partial
derivative of ui(pi, p−i, πi) with respect to pi and equating
the result to zero, the best response function Bi(p−i) can be
derived as the following closed-form:
Bi(p−i) =
[
wi
giπi
−
∆i(p−i)
hi,i
]pi
0
, (7)
where [x]ba := max{min{x, b}, a} and ∆i(p−i) :=∑
j 6=i pjhj,i + σ
2 is the interference-plus-noise (IpN) term.
Denote B(p) := {B1(p−1),B2(p−2), · · · ,BN (p−N)}, then
we present an iterative distributed algorithm for the noncoop-
erative power allocation subgame G in Algorithm 1.
At the beginning of Algorithm 1, each user i arbitrarily
chooses its initial power level in its own strategy space Pi
and then p(0) is feasible.
For a noncooperative game, it is of great important to study
the existence of the pure NE point and the convergence of
the iterative process, which are critical for the outcome of the
game being stable and eventually arriving. Before leaving this
subsection, we give the following proposition to guarantee the
existence and uniqueness of the NE point in the user-level
subgame and the convergence of the proposed Algorithm 1.
Proposition 1. For any given price vector pi  0, the pure
NE point of the user-level subgame G exists and is unique.
Moreover, Algorithm 1 always converges to the unique NE
point for any initial feasible power vector p(0).
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
It is worth noting that the existence of a fixed point (even
it is unique) of an iterative process does not necessarily
maintain the convergence, and the existence of a fixed point
and convergence are two separate concepts of an iterative
process. We can prove that the proposed iterative distributed
algorithm in Algorithm 1 can converge to the unique NE since
the best response function is standard and each user has a peak
power constraint [37].
B. Interference Pricing
Now we turn to look at how the BS makes the pricing
decisions for revenue maximization with interference con-
5straint in Stage I. Finding the optimal solution of P1 in
(1) always resorts to exhaustive search over all ranges of
pi  0. Due to the prohibitively computational complexity of
the exhaustive search, we alternatively propose two efficient
pricing algorithms, one for uniform pricing and the other for
differentiated pricing with limited and global network infor-
mation, respectively. The uniform pricing algorithm assigns
an identical price to all users, while the differentiated pricing
algorithm charges different received interference power levels
by different prices.
1) Uniform Pricing with Limited Information: In this case,
the BS sets and broadcasts a uniform price to all users,
i.e., π1 = π2 · · · = πN = π. Then the interference-
constrained revenue maximization problem in P1 reduces to
a one-dimensional search problem over price π ≥ 0. To
demonstrate more insights into the interaction between the
BS and users, we first analyze the properties of the revenue
function uB(π) in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal uniform price π∗ must satisfy πl ≤
π∗ ≤ πu, where πu and πl are the upper and lower bounds
of π∗
πu = max
i∈N
wihi,i
giσ2
, (8)
πl = min
i∈N
wihi,i
gi
(
pihi,i +∆i(p−i)
) . (9)
The BS’s revenue function uB(π) has the following properties:
1) uB(π) ≥ 0;
2) uB(π) <∞ if the number of users is finite;
3) uB(π) = 0 if and only if π = 0 or π ≥ πu;
4) uB(π) = π
∑N
i=1 pigi if and only if 0 ≤ π ≤ πl.
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
The above proposition yields the following interpretation:
the optimal price lies in a certain range, depending on channel
conditions, user weights, interference, and peak power con-
straints; the BS’s revenue is always nonnegative because the
transmit powers of the users are nonnegative; the maximum
revenue is bounded if the number of users is finite; the revenue
vanishes if the price is too high or too low.
According to Proposition 2, we derive the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 1. When π > πl, the peak power constraint of each
user is not active at the NE point in the user-level subgame
G. In this case, 0 ≤ Bi(p−i) < pi, ∀i ∈ N .
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
Based on the above analysis, we know that, 1) If 0 ≤ π ≤
πl, each user transmits its maximum power and the aggregate
received interference at the BS is upper bounded, and the
corresponding payment to the BS is linear with the price. The
intuitive explanation is that, if the BS’s price is low enough,
every user can afford the payment charged by the BS and
will transmit power at a high level; 2) When π ≥ πl, every
user reduces its transmit power due to the increased payment
charged by the BS, and the transmit power of each user is
decreasing with the price; 3) The BS’s revenue finally vanishes
if π ≥ πu.
Algorithm 2 Uniform Pricing for interference management
1: The BS initializes the interference price as πu.
2: τ = 0 and ǫ is a small positive constant.
3: repeat
4: τ ← τ + 1;
5: Every user runs Algorithm 1;
6: The BS measures the total received interference and
computes revenue;
7: if
∑N
i=1 pigi ≤ Ith then
8: π(τ+1) ← π(τ) − ǫ;
9: else
10: π∗ ← π(τ).
11: break;
12: end if
13: until π(τ+1) ≤ πl.
14: Output π∗ ← argmaxpi(τ) uB(π(τ)).
Note that the monotonicity of uB(π) between the interval
[πl, πu] is very complex. However, the above analysis signif-
icantly reduces the complexity. By exploiting these observa-
tions, we propose a feasible way to find the optimal price: We
first divide the price interval [πl, πu] into sufficiently small
intervals, and for each small interval, the BS picks a price
that falls into the small interval and estimates the aggregate
received interference. The BS bargains with the users over
all candidate prices and finally chooses the price that results
in the maximum revenue while maintaining the interference
temperature constraint. Formally, we present the distributed
uniform pricing algorithm in Algorithm 2.
There are several points need to be noted. First, in Algo-
rithm 2, the initial price is selected as πu rather than πl. If
choose πl as the initial price, it only requires to slightly modify
Algorithm 2 and the details are omitted here for brevity.
Second, in the process of price bargaining, the BS gradually
decreases the price with the step size ǫ as the initial price is
πu. The algorithm ends as long as the interference temperature
constraint is active and there is no need for bargaining the rest
of price candidates. This is due to the fact that the transmit
power of each user is decreasing with the price in [πl, πu],
and so is the the total received interference at the BS, which
have been proved in the proof of Corollary 1.
Third, it is easy to calculate the revenue. In the proposed
uniform pricing framework, the revenue is the product of
the uniform price and the total received interference at the
BS. Therefore, the BS can obtain its revenue directly after
measuring the total received interference. One also observes
that, in Algorithm 2, the message passing between the BS and
the users is only the broadcasted value of the price in each
iteration.
2) Differentiated Pricing with Global Information: Here we
consider the general case where different users are charged
by different prices at the BS, i.e., differentiated pricing (also
known as price discrimination in economics), by assuming that
the BS knows the global network information.
Denote pi = {π1, · · · , πN} and p∗ = {p∗1, · · · , p∗N} the
corresponding optimal power vector on the NE point of the
user game. By reorganizing (7), the optimal price pi and the
6optimal power vector on the NE point p∗ have the following
relationship:
πi =
wihi,i
gi
(∑N
j=1 p
∗
jhj,i + σ
2
) , ∀i ∈ N . (10)
Using (10), we can express the revenue function of the
BS in terms of transmit powers at the NE point of the user-
level subgame. As a consequence, the interference-constrained
revenue maximization problem in P1 can be rewritten as
max
p∗
uB(pi(p
∗)) =
N∑
i=1
p∗iwihi,i∑N
j=1 p
∗
jhj,i + σ
2
(11a)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
p∗i gi ≤ Ith (11b)
0 ≤ p∗i ≤ pi, ∀i ∈ N . (11c)
By letting
yi =
pi∑N
j=1 p
∗
jhj,i + σ
2
and
zi =
1∑N
j=1 p
∗
jhj,i + σ
2
,
the problem in (11) can be transformed as
max
{yi,zi}
N∑
i=1
wihi,iyi (12a)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
giyi − Ithzi ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ N (12b)
yi − pizi ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ N (12c)
N∑
j=1
hj,iyi + ziσ
2 = 1, ∀i ∈ N (12d)
yi ≥ 0, zi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N . (12e)
By doing so, it can be easily shown that the problem in
(12) is a standard linear programming problem [36], and
thus a global optimum can be computed very efficiently.1
After finding the optimal y∗i and z∗i by solving (12), p∗ can
be recovered using p∗i := y∗i /z∗i , ∀i, and then pi∗ can be
determined using (10).
Note that (10)-(12) are used for determining the optimal
prices pi. Though the optimal power p∗ can also obtained in
this process, it is exactly the same as the NE point of user-
level game p∗(pi) for given optimal price pi: the BS broadcasts
the prices pi to the users and, in turn, enforces the users to
transmit the desired powers p∗ at the NE point of the user-level
subgame. This is true since we have proved in Proposition 1
that the user-level subgame G always converges to the unique
NE point for any given price vector.
Finally, we summarize the differentiated pricing algorithm
in Algorithm 3. Note that the proposed Algorithm 3 does not
need to iterate between the BS and users. Nevertheless, the BS
needs to collect the global network information from the users
1Many numerical solvers for linear programming are available, e.g.,
MOSEK and CVX.
Algorithm 3 Differentiated Pricing for interference manage-
ment
1: Given any price vector pi, every user runs Algorithm 1.
2: The BS collects the global network information for solving
the problem in (12), and then finds the optimal price vector
pi using (10).
for computing prices. This is possible since D2D users are
controlled by the BS [3]–[5]. We also need to point out that,
the BS does not need to intelligently tell or control the users
which power strategies to make, that is, the power allocations
of the users still remain a distributed fashion with local CSI.
Hence, Algorithm 3 is a partially distributed algorithm.
3) Suboptimal Differentiated Pricing: Algorithm 3 finds
the optimal differentiated pricing policy, but it needs to be
computed numerically when solving (12). Here we propose
a suboptimal differentiated pricing scheme which has closed-
form and thus significantly reduces the computational com-
plexity. The suboptimal scheme is based on two assumptions:
(i) See (1b), stronger gi yields to higher utility from a seller’s
perspective. Thus the BS may just pre-set the interference
tolerance margin for all users in proportion to {gi}, then the
interference temperature constraint in (1b) can be written as
pigi ≤
gi∑
i∈N gi
Ith, ∀i ∈ N . (13)
(ii) The transmitter-receiver distance of a D2D connection is
usually very short, thus we assume that hi,i ≫ hj,i (∀j 6=
i) due to the effects of path-loss when the D2D users are
uniformly distributed. In this case, the IpN term ∆i(p−i) =∑
j 6=i pjhj,i + σ
2 ≈ σ2, ∀i, and the optimal power of user i
can be approximated as
p∗i ≈
[
wi
giπi
−
σ2
hi,i
]pi
0
. (14)
Substituting (13) and (14) into P1, the problem can be
decoupled to N parallel subproblems and each having an
identical structure:
max
pii
wi −
σ2giπi
hi,i
(15a)
s.t.
[
wi
giπi
−
σ2
hi,i
]
≤
Ith∑
i∈N gi
(15b)
wihi,i
gi(pihi,i + σ
2)
≤ πi ≤
wihi,i
giσ2
, (15c)
where (15c) ensures 0 ≤ p∗i ≤ pi. The optimal price π∗i can
be obtained as
π∗i =


wihi,i
gi(pihi,i+σ
2) , if Ith ≥ pi
∑
i∈N gi
wihi,i
gi
(
Ithhi,i∑
i∈N gi
+σ2
) , otherwise. (16)
One can see that the suboptimal differentiated pricing
scheme only needs the limited network information to compute
optimal prices, and the BS can interact each user indepen-
dently. Thus the suboptimal differentiated pricing scheme is a
fully distributed scheme.
7C. Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, we discuss the complexity of the pro-
posed three algorithms at the user side and BS side, respec-
tively.
1) Complexity at User Side: For the optimal uniform and
differentiated pricing, the needed network information at the
user side are the same because the power allocation of the
users form the noncooperative subgame G by the best response
function Bi(p−i) in (7). Note that each user i knows its weight
wi and πi is broadcasted by the BS, Bi(p−i) can be computed
by user i based on local information only, including hi,i, gi,
and ∆i(p−i). Specifically, hi,i and gi can be obtained via
training. That is, the source of user i sends training signals
and other nodes receive them, then its own destination and
BS estimate hi,i and gi, respectively, where hi,i can be sent
via feedback channel, and the uplink channel information gi
can be sent through feedback channel or downlink via time-
division duplex (TDD) mode. In addition, the destination of
user i can measure the IpN term ∆i(p−i) and send the value
to its source.2
In summary, at each D2D transmitter i, only hi,i and
∆i(p−i) are needed, which can be measured at its receiver
i and fed back to transmitter i. This process can be completed
by the help of BS. For example, if transmitter i wants to know
CSI hi,i, it transmits training symbols in broadcast manner.
Receiver i first estimates and sends hi,i to BS and then BS
sends the information to transmitter i. Such an information ac-
quisition process for establishing D2D connections is defined
in 3GPP specifications.
Moreover, for the optimal differentiated pricing, the cross
channel gains {hj,i}j 6=i additionally need to be estimated at
the receivers. Since the training symbols are transmitted in
broadcast manner, other adjacent D2D receivers j 6= i also
can receive them and thus estimate hj,i and then feed back
to BS for computing differentiated prices. Note that {hj,i}j 6=i
are no need for the transmitters.
For the suboptimal differentiated pricing, the needed net-
work information at the user side are the same as above, and
the only difference is that the power allocation (14) does not
need to iterate but the best response function Bi(p−i) in (7)
needs iteration.
2) Complexity at BS Side: For the uniform pricing at the
BS side, the needed information are (please see (8) and (9))
channel gains hi,i and gi, IpN ∆i(p−i), weight wi and peak
power constraint pi. For the optimal differentiated pricing at
the BS side, the needed information are (please see (11)) chan-
nel gains hi,i, hj,i (j 6= i) and gi, weight wi and peak power
constraint pi. Comparing the needed network information of
the uniform and the optimal differentiated pricing, the only
difference is that the uniform pricing needs IpN ∆i(p−i) and
the optimal differentiated pricing needs interference channel
gains among users hj,i (j 6= i). The dimensions of {∆i(p−i)}
and {hj,i}j 6=i are N×1 and N× (N−1), respectively, where
N is the number of users.
2The destination can measure the total received power via reference signals
(defined in 3GPP LTE) and is also aware of the desired power from its own
source. By extracting the desired received power from the total received power,
∆i(p−i) is obtained.
For the suboptimal differentiated pricing, the only difference
compared to the optimal differentiated pricing is that the cross
channel gains {hj,i}j 6=i are no need by the assumption of the
negligible interference among users.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we conduct comprehensive simulations to
evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms for
distributed power allocation and interference management in
D2D cellular networks. Without loss of generality, we let the
weights wi = 1 and the noise powers σ2 = 1. We assume all
D2D users have the same maximum power constraints in dB.
Since we focus on controlling the interference from the D2D
users to the BS, we assume that in simulation there are only
D2D transmissions for simplicity. Note that this does not affect
the proposed algorithms since the impacts of uplink cellular
transmissions can be integrated into the noise power in the
SINR expressions of D2D users.
We consider a cell with a radius of 100. For an illustration
purpose, we consider N = 4 D2D users that are randomly
but uniformly distributed within the coverage of the cell. The
source-destination distance of each D2D user is randomly
distributed between (0, 10]. The fading channels are modeled
as c · L−θ, where c is the small-scale fading factor which is
modeled by Rayleigh fading process, L is the transmission
distance and θ is the path loss exponent which is set to be 2
for the large-scale fading.
For a given random channel realization, we first investigate
the convergence performance of the proposed iterative based
distributed power allocation algorithm in Algorithm 1. As
shown in Fig. 3, where the peak power constraints are pi = 10
dB, ∀i, and the price is prefixed as πu/10, we can observe that
the convergence speed of the proposed Algorithm 1 is very
fast, in specific, only about 3 iterations are needed for this
example. Moreover, we observe that the initial power vectors
p
(0) = 0 and p(0) = p do not affect the final power outputs,
which verifies the Proposition 1 that the NE point is regardless
of the initial feasible power vector p(0).
Next, for the same channel realization, Fig. 4 studies the
performance of the proposed uniform pricing scheme in Al-
gorithm 2, where the peak power constraints are pi = 10 dB,
∀i. In Fig. 4(a), we observe that the revenue is linear with
the price at the start and nonconvex after a certain point (i.e.,
lower bound price πl) and finally becomes zero at a certain
point (i.e., upper bound price πu). One also observes from
Fig. 4(b) that the powers keep maximum at the start (i.e.,
[0, πl]) and are decreasing with the price, so is the aggregate
interference at the BS in Fig. 4(c). These observations are in
accordance with our analysis given in Section III-B.
Then we investigate the convergence performance of Algo-
rithm 1 with 100 D2D users in Fig. 5 for a given channel
realization, where we set pi = 10 dB, ∀i, and π = πu/10. We
can observe that Algorithm 1 converges fast even with 100
users, i.e. 4 iterations in this example. This demonstrates the
effectiveness of Algorithm 1.
Moreover, we investigate impact of the uniform price in
Algorithm 1 on users’ transmit power in Fig. 6 for a given
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Fig. 3. Convergence performance of Algorithm 1 with 4 D2D users, where pi = 10 dB, ∀i, and pi = piu/10.
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Fig. 4. Performance of the uniform pricing scheme in Algorithm 2.
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Fig. 5. Convergence performance of Algorithm 1 with 100 D2D pairs, where
pi = 10 dB, ∀i, and pi = piu/10.
channel realization, where we set pi = 10 dB, ∀i, and
N = 100 D2D pairs are considered. We can observe that
all users will transmit their maximum power when π = 0,
which is accord with the conclusion in [30] that it is a regular
noncooperative power control game in this case. We also
observe that if the price is becoming larger, more and more
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Fig. 6. The number of D2D transmitters of Algorithm 1 with different prices,
where N = 100 D2D pairs and pi = 10 dB.
users are not willing to transmit (i.e., pi = 0). This also
coincides with our analysis in Section III.
In Figs. 7 and 8, we evaluate and compare the statistical (or
average) performance of the three proposed pricing algorithms
based on two distinct performance metrics, i.e., sum rates
and revenue. A total of 1000 channel realizations are used.
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Fig. 7. Performance of the three proposed pricing algorithms, where the
interference temperature constraint is set as Ith = 0.05.
For each channel realization, the location and the source-
destination distance of each D2D user are random. For the
uniform pricing scheme in Algorithm 2, the step size of the
price is selected as ǫ = (πu − πl)/1000.
In Fig. 7, we fix the interference temperature constraint
Ith = 0.05. It is observed that the revenue of the BS with
the differentiated pricing schemes is generally larger than that
with the uniform pricing scheme, while it is reverse for the
sum-rate of the D2D users. Note that the D2D users and the
BS have the conflicting objectives. That is, higher utility of
the D2D users means lower utility of the BS, and vice versa.
Hence, more efficient pricing scheme yields to higher utility of
the BS but lower utility of the D2D users. We observe from
Fig. 7(a) that, when SNR is below 15 dB, the suboptimal
differentiated pricing scheme and the uniform pricing scheme
perform closely in terms of sum rates of the D2D users, but
the uniform pricing scheme has better performance if SNR is
higher than 15 dB. Fig. 7(b) shows that the two differentiated
pricing schemes outperform the uniform pricing scheme in
terms of revenue over a wide range of SNR. Moreover, the
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Fig. 8. Performance of the three proposed pricing algorithms, where the
peak power constraints are set as pi = 20 dB, ∀i.
two differentiated pricing schemes have the similar revenue
performance when SNR is below 15 dB, and the optimal
differentiated pricing scheme outperforms the suboptimal one
when SNR is higher than 15 dB.
In Fig. 8, we fix the peak power constraints pi = 20 dB,
∀i. For the performance of sum rates, Fig. 8(a) shows that
the uniform pricing scheme outperforms the two differentiated
pricing schemes, and the suboptimal differentiated pricing
scheme is better than the optimal differentiated pricing scheme
in term of sum-rate of the users. The reason is mentioned in
above. For the performance of revenue, Fig. 8(b) illustrates
that the optimal differentiated pricing scheme has the best
performance as expected. The uniform pricing scheme is better
than the suboptimal differentiated pricing scheme when Ith is
stringent, and the uniform pricing scheme is worse than the
suboptimal differentiated pricing scheme when Ith is loose.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied distributed power allocation and
interference management for the D2D enabled cellular net-
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works. The interference temperature constraint was applied
at the BS to ensure that the aggregate received interference
from the D2D users is below a threshold. The interactions
between the BS and D2D users were modeled as a Stackelberg
game. Based on the noncooperative game theory, we proposed
an iterative distributed power allocation algorithm for the
D2D users, and proved that there always exists a unique
NE point. We proposed a uniform pricing algorithm for the
interference-constrained revenue maximization at the BS, un-
der the assumption that the BS only knows the limited network
information. Then a differentiated pricing algorithm was also
presented by assuming that the BS has the global network
information. We also proposed a suboptimal differentiated
pricing scheme to reduce complexity. It was shown that the
uniform pricing algorithm can be implemented with distributed
manner and requires minimum information exchange between
the BS and the D2D users. We also showed that the optimal
and suboptimal differentiated pricing algorithms are iteration-
free between the BS and the D2D users, and they are partially
and fully distributed, respectively. The proposed framework
and algorithms are useful and practical for resource alloca-
tion and interference management in spectrum-sharing D2D
communications.
There are several research directions for future work. In this
paper, the network nodes are assumed to be cooperative, which
means that the BS and users follow the proposed algorithms,
including the BS announcing the correct price signals and the
users transmitting their pilots/beacons at the correct power
levels. A challenging extension is to provide incentives for
players to report the correct signals truthfully, or design
punishment policies against cheating behaviors. Moreover, the
nodes are assumed as myopic and the solution is NE, it is also
interesting to consider the foresight players such that the nodes
aim to maximize their long-term payoffs instead of immediate
payoffs.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Here we only describe the key points and briefly to prove
Proposition 1 as follows.
To prove the existence of NE, we can show that: in subgame
G, for every user, the power strategy space Pi is a nonempty,
convex, and compact subset of a Euclidean space, and the
payoff function ui(pi, p−i, πi) is continuous in p and quasi-
concave3 in pi, for all i ∈ N [38].
Next, we prove the uniqueness of NE. By definition, the
NE is the fixed point in the best response function set that
satisfies p = B(p). For the two extreme cases of B(p) = 0
and B(p) = p, where p = {p1, · · · , pN}, the fixed point of
the best response function is unique and corresponds to the
peak transmit power and zero transmit power for all users,
respectively. For the other cases, we prove the uniqueness
relying on the concept of standard function [37]. It has been
proven in [37] that the NE point (if it exists) in a standard
function is unique. A function B(p) is said to be standard if
for all feasible power p , the following conditions hold [37]
3Quasi-concave is a generalization of concave.
• Positivity: B(p) > 0;
• Monotonicity: if p  p˜, then B(p)  B(p˜);
• Scalability: for all c > 1, cB(p) > B(cp).
Here we omit the routine details of the proof.
It is worth noting that the existence of a fixed point (even it
is unique) of an iterative process does not necessarily maintain
the convergence, and the existence of a fixed point and
convergence are two separate concepts of an iterative process.
We prove that the proposed iterative distributed algorithm in
Algorithm 1 can converge to the unique NE since the best
response function is standard and each user has a peak power
constraint [37].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Properties 1) and 2) can be easily observed. Let B(p) = p
and B(p) = 0, we can obtain πl and πu, respectively. If
π ≥ πu , max
i∈N
wihi,i
giσ2
, (17)
then
π ≥
wihi,i
giσ2
, ∀i, (18)
which means that
wi
giπ
≤
σ2
hi,i
, ∀i. (19)
Combining the fact that
σ2
hi,i
≤
σ2 +
∑
j 6=i pjhj,i
hi,i
,
∆i(p−i)
hi,i
, (20)
we conclude that
wi
giπ
≤
∆i(p−i)
hi,i
, ∀i. (21)
Plugging it into the best response function Bi(p−i), it is
concluded that Bi(p−i) = 0 for all i ∈ N and thus uB(π) = 0.
Moreover, uB(π) = 0 if π = 0 obviously holds.
Similarly, if
π ≤ πl , min
i∈N
wihi,i
gi
(
pihi,i +∆i(p−i)
) , (22)
then
π ≤
wihi,i
gi
(
pihi,i +∆i(p−i)
) , ∀i, (23)
which means that
wi
giπ
≥
pihi,i +∆i(p−i)
hi,i
= pi +
∆i(p−i)
hi,i
, (24)
or equivalently
wi
giπ
−
∆i(p−i)
hi,i
≥ pi. (25)
Plugging it into the best response function Bi(p−i), it is
concluded that Bi(p−i) = pi for all i ∈ N and thus
uB(π) = π
∑N
i=1 pigi.
On the other hand, if uB(π) = 0, then π = 0 or pi = 0 for
all i. The former case is trivial and for the later case, it should
be
wi
giπ
−
∆i(p−i)
hi,i
≤ 0, ∀i. (26)
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This leads to
π ≥
wihi,i
giσ2
, ∀i, (27)
which means
π ≥ max
i∈N
wihi,i
giσ2
, πu. (28)
Similarly, if uB(π) = π
∑N
i=1 pigi, it should be pi = pi for
all i, or
wi
giπ
−
∆i(p−i)
hi,i
≥ pi, ∀i. (29)
This means that
min
i∈N
wi
giπ
−
∆i(p−i)
hi,i
≥ pi, (30)
and thus
0 ≤ π ≤ min
i∈N
wihi,i
gi
(
pihi,i +∆i(p−i)
) , πl. (31)
The two extreme cases B(p) = 0 and B(p) = p are also
the NE points for given price. Then the properties 3) and 4)
can be proved.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
By differentiating the best response function Bi(p−i) with
respect to π, it can be shown that Bi(p−i) is a strictly
decreasing function of π when πl ≤ π ≤ πu. As stated
in the proof of Proposition 2, Bi(p−i) = pi when π = πl.
Therefore the peak power constraint of user i is not active if
πl < π ≤ πu, i.e., 0 ≤ Bi(p−i) < pi, ∀i ∈ N . When π > πu,
Bi(p−i) ≡ 0, ∀i ∈ N . This completes the proof.
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